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At present, there is no single global economic or military superpower. The European Union deeply links the European continent economically, and recently formed the biggest trading bloc in the world with South America. The United States, formerly the unitary superpower, is now rivalled by China militarily in key regions around Taiwan. Some estimates put China’s military spending in 2024 at a minimum of $318 billion, and a maximum $471 billion USD. The Chinese economy, too, has been closing its gap with the U.S. and expanding its global influence. India, the world’s most populous country with 1.14 billion people, is the fifth-largest economy by GDP. Russia, economically weak after years of sanctions and isolation, maintains a sphere of influence in the global South and close ties with various countries through the eleven-member BRICS alliance, which it leads.
In this multipolar and globalized context, the return of a unipolar order is unlikely, barring a major upheaval to the balance of power, such as a World War. Major powers are accepting that global hegemony is unlikely in an increasingly protectionist international environment, defined by far-right political leaders and authoritarian governments that reject international liberalism. Major superpowers, China and the U.S., and weaker but strong powers like Russia, now seek something closer to home: regional hegemony.
IR scholarship and attention to regional power dynamics
In the mid 2000s and 2010s, there was a renewed scholarly interest in the role of regional powers in international relations. Most of this research, however, focused on middle powers, and the tension between an interest in international relevance and power, and an interest in regional hegemony. In a 2010 issue of International Relations Review,, Sandra Destradi argues in “Regional powers and their strategies: empire, hegemony, and leadership” that regional powers employ a variety of strategies to gain power. At the end of the continuum is empire: an aggressive strategy where control is unilaterally enforced through force or the threat of force. This is a hegemonic strategy prone to risks, namely a lack of legitimacy and a drain on resources due to the high amount of mobilization needed to maintain control through force. In the middle is hegemony, through coercive measures such as sanctions and threats, material incentives, or normative persuasion to gain acquiescence. Finally, there is leadership, which depends on the pursuit of common pursuits towards collective objectives.
Similarly, an article from the same issue, “Hegemony, Domination, Detachment: Differences in Regional Powerhood,” by Miriam Prys proposes three ideal types: regional hegemons, regional dominators, and regionally detached powers. Hegemons provide public goods to gain acceptance as the leading power, while dominators command smaller states through threats of force. Detached powers have the material capability to lead but prioritize domestic or global politics over their region.
Both of these articles are well-equipped to examine regional power competition between middle powers. Superpowers –especially the U.S. and China– were conceived as viewing their regions as part of a larger goal of international hegemony. What the existing scholarship fails to account for is the interest in regional domination, especially from the United States, possibly because it seemed near-impossible fifteen years ago.
An Ideological Imperative
In the current international environment, a pressing question arises: are contemporary actions by great powers truly motivated by concerns about regional encroachment, or are such threats exaggerated?
This shift is not simply a balance-of-power phenomenon. It is very much ideological, reflecting a recognition that unipolarity is impossible – and would likely only result from an extremely costly world war – but also that international norms of sovereignty and cooperation are falling out of favour compared to more traditional perspectives of hard and coercive power. The 2008 and 2020 financial crises undermined international liberalism, pushing protectionist and far-right politics to the mainstream. The ensuing financial nationalism usurped the transnational consensus of cooperation between large and small powers and challenged the ideal of international economic integration. As international decoupling occurs, either politically or economically, financial nationalist policies are linked to opposition towards the political and economic status quo. Powerful states, amid a surge in nationalist and nativist views, seek to safeguard their regions both economically, politically, and militarily for themselves.
This ideological shift creates a sense of urgency which justifies military action and imperial invasion. Rather than having to convince smaller regional states to join you instead of other major powers, taking time and involving concessions, great powers would rather use coercion to force acquiescence and avoid concessions. Regional domination, based on a perceived imminent threat, is enforced through unilateral and opaque military action, such as U.S. boat strikes in the Caribbean and the capture of Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, which circumvented oversight of Congress through justification as a law enforcement operation. This idea of law enforcement has a powerful symbolic message: U.S. law extends beyond its borders, and can be enforced unilaterally so long as it aligns with what the U.S. deems in its 2026 national security strategy, “America’s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere.” Mr. Trump’s tariff threats towards Europe for resisting U.S. control over Greenland illustrate this strategy of cross-border coercion.
Regional Responses
A strategy of brute strength, while powerful in the short term, sets up future isolation. It could be argued that domination works and isolation is manageable if you’re strong enough. For states wishing to dominate their hemisphere, isolation is an appealing sign of self-reliance. In reality, isolation pushes adversaries together. Although strength is a universal language, it does not win wars: logistics does. The United States is the world’s military superpower because it has bases around the globe, enabling it to stage attacks, refuel and resupply its forces virtually anywhere. If an invasion of Greenland is undertaken, these bases may be closed or repossessed, severely limiting the U.S. ability to project power. States may respond to a strategy of regional domination with economic warfare. In Europe, the Russian invasion of Ukraine prompted punishing sanctions and a move away from Russian gas. Now, Russia is isolated economically, forcing it to rely heavily on China and India for oil revenues, a major vulnerability.
China, attempting to position itself as a more stable and appealing partner in comparison to the now unpredictable and forceful U.S., would also become isolated by an invasion of Taiwan. Its attempts to court traditionally apprehensive states such as Canada and the United Kingdom would be undermined. The domestic political and strategic gain of Taiwan might quickly be offset by the missed opportunity to fill the power vacuum left by the U.S., as it increasingly turns its back on the international alliances which solidified its superpower status.
A strategy of domination was previously held back by a strong, albeit not consistently enforced, rule-based international order, premised on respect for state sovereignty and international multilateralism. As this has fallen apart, so too have regional and global alliances, which also decreases the likelihood of regional cooperation by choice in the future. A strategy of regional domination, however, is not foolproof, and the resulting isolation lays the groundwork for a decline in regional power, global influence, and domestic stability.
Edited by Jude Archer
The argument defended in this article is solely that of the author and does not reflect the position of the McGill Journal of Political Science, the Political Science Students’ Association, or the McGill Department of Political Science.
“DSCN5622 Punda (as shot)” published to Flickr by Drew Murray on January 2, 2026, under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. No changes were made.
