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A Historical Rivalry
Tensions between China and Taiwan have escalated since late December 2025, following Beijing’s announcement of live-fire military exercises around the island. Taiwan said it detected 89 military aircraft as well as 28 Chinese warships and coast guard vessels operating near its territory. This is the highest number of Chinese aircraft reported in a single day since October 2024.
These recent developments do not mark a sudden rupture. Long-standing tensions across the Taiwan Strait are rooted in two key historical developments that shaped today’s fragile balance. To begin, Taiwan’s democratization during the 1990s deepened its political divisions with China by fostering a distinct Taiwanese identity and strengthening ties with the United States. At the same time, the 1992 Consensus provided a limited framework for dialogue between Taipei and Beijing that remains highly contentious.
Its core premise, “one China, with respective interpretations”, was never formally written down or jointly ratified. This deliberate vagueness allowed talks to occur in the 1990s, but also means the two sides are not actually agreeing on the same political reality as Beijing is structurally favored. The loosely defined 1992 framework also lacks domestic legitimacy in Taiwan. It was negotiated by semi-official bodies rather than elected representatives, and public opinion in Taiwan has evolved since the early 1990s.
This has produced a status quo defined by neither war nor peace, in which unification with China and full independence are both out of reach: a democratic Taiwan with growing influence over cross-strait relations, a China that has long sought gradual reunification, and a United States that supports Taiwan militarily to contain China’s rise. However, the conditions that once sustained this equilibrium are increasingly eroding, calling into question the durability of the status quo.
China’s strategy
China’s strategy toward Taiwan has become increasingly coercive, aimed at weakening the island from within. Beijing has long relied on operations designed to fragment Taiwanese society by exploiting social divisions, while simultaneously conducting psychological, legal, and information warfare to distract attention from the external threat. According to Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, Chinese cyberattacks on the island’’s key infrastructure rose 6% in 2025 from the previous year to an average of 2.63 million attacks a day.
This approach is underpinned by an unchanged objective: the annexation of the island and the elimination of the Taiwanese government, pursued through sustained intimidation and expanding infiltration of Taiwanese institutions.
The 2005 Anti-Secession Law and more recent guidelines have formalized China’s willingness to use force against those who reject its claims over Taiwan. Internationally, Beijing also seeks to legitimize these claims by reinterpreting United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758. Adopted in 1971, this resolution recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate representative of China at the UN and sidelined Taiwan’s government. Beijing asserts that the resolution settles Taiwan’s status as part of China, even though the resolution itself says nothing about Taiwan’s sovereignty or legal status.
Beijing has increasingly leveraged Taiwan’s democratic openness to penetrate media, civil society, political parties, and even security institutions, reinforcing a strategy that prioritizes internal destabilization alongside external pressure. In January 2026, the detention of a reporter who allegedly bribed military officers to provide information to China suggests that Beijing’s infiltration is a long-term, structural presence in Taiwan. The value of such penetration is not necessarily spreading propaganda but shaping agenda-setting and narratives in ways favorable to China while appearing legitimate.
Under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has carried out one of the largest peacetime military buildups in modern history. This expansion has focused on naval, and precision-strike capabilities designed to seize Taiwan and deter U.S. and allied intervention in the region. In an interview with the Economist, Taiwan’s navy commander warns that China is using an “Anaconda strategy” to slowly but surely squeeze the island.
China has not yet resorted to brute force because its strategic, political, economic, and military constraints make coercion below the threshold of war more effective and less costly than outright conflict.To summarize, an invasion would be extremely risky and uncertain due to Taiwan’s defenses and difficult geography. It would also very likely trigger severe economic sanctions and possible military involvement from the United States and its allies.
U.S. Signals and Cross-Strait Stability
Some scholars argue that recent U.S. actions, notably in Venezuela, may embolden China rather than deter it by signaling a shift in American security priorities away from the Indo-Pacific. As Larry Diamond warns, such moves risk diluting U.S. focus and capacity on Taiwan at a moment when China is intensifying military exercises around the island. Together, these trends suggest deterrence across the Taiwan Strait is increasingly fragile, with rising military pressure intersecting with perceived shifts in U.S. attention.
Despite drawing parallels between the U.S. operation in Venezuela and a possible Taiwan scenario, Beijing’s Taiwan policy will almost certainly remain unchanged. Henry Gao, law professor at Singapore Management University, explains how China hasn’t acted against Taiwan not for lack of legal justification but because it lacks the capability, meaning that U.S. operations in Venezuela did not create a valid precedent for Beijing to alter its Taiwan strategy.
Official Chinese responses have focused on condemning the U.S. action as a violation of international norms, reinforcing Beijing’s narrative of defending sovereignty rather than signaling any shift toward military action against Taiwan. This framing suggests that China will continue to pursue its existing strategy of coercion and pressure below the threshold of open conflict, rather than treating the Venezuelan incident as a template for change.
The Erosion of Deterrence
The Taiwan Strait is increasingly marked by accelerating strategic tension stemming from Taiwan’s democratization and shifting identity, alongside the unresolved ambiguity of the 1992 Consensus. This environment is further shaped by China’s persistent reunification strategy, now backed by growing coercive power, and by a U.S. deterrent role that remains pivotal but increasingly uncertain.
China’s approach reflects a calculated preference for coercion short of open conflict, designed to shift the balance while avoiding the prohibitive costs of invasion. Taiwan’s democratic consolidation and growing sense of political distinctiveness have narrowed Beijing’s non-military options, even as China’s expanding military capabilities increase pressure on the status quo.
At the same time, U.S. support for Taiwan remains central to deterrence, yet increasingly complicated by global commitments and perceptions of strategic distraction. Recent events do not fundamentally alter China’s calculus, which remains driven by capability, risk, and timing rather than legal justification. The danger lies less in a sudden decision for war than in the gradual erosion of restraint, as political warfare becomes normalized. In this environment, miscalculation grows more likely, and deterrence becomes harder to sustain.
Edited by Patrick Armstrong
The argument defended in this article is solely that of the author and does not reflect the position of the McGill Journal of Political Science, the Political Science Students’ Association, or the McGill Department of Political Science.
Featured image by Agenzia Nova
