Three Regimes, Three Justifications
Under tsarist autocracy, the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire declared that the monarch’s authority was ordained by “God Himself.” Even after the 1905 revolution that forced tsar Nicholas II to form an elected parliament: the State Duma, the revised Fundamental Laws of 1906 reinforced the Tsar’s power by stipulating that no law could take effect without his permission, thus granting the Tsar exclusive power to amend the Fundamental Law itself and mandating that all meetings of the parliament be called and scheduled by imperial decree. The Tsar’s power came from God, and his title “Tsar of all the Russians” declared that his authority extended over all his subjects, but was not derived from any of them. In other words, the State Duma was not an embodiment of popular sovereignty, but rather a top-down and limited, quasi-legislative compromise made by an imperial power.
The Bolsheviks seized power during the Russian Revolution in October 1917, promising a complete break with the tsar’s autocratic order. They organized elections to the Constituent Assembly—the body in charge of drafting Russia’s new constitution. However, the results went against the Bolsheviks: they lost to the Socialist Revolutionaries, receiving only twenty-four per cent of the parliamentary seats. When the Assembly met in 1918, troops loyal to the Bolshevik government dispersed it after a single day. For the Bolsheviks, ignoring the vote was no betrayal of their Marxist ideology. Lenin argued that the Soviets, the council through which the workers and soldiers exercise their power, were “a higher form of democracy” than the Constituent Assembly, because it represented the “true interests of the working masses.” For Lenin, the Bolsheviks knew what the working class truly needed, and therefore did not need to consult the general public.
Following the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the legitimacy of the Soviet state was based mainly on the premise that the communist party alone could represent the working class and lead it towards communism. The 1977 Soviet Constitution captured the contradiction between the people’s sovereignty and the rule of the party, declaring that “all power in the USSR belongs to the people,” yet simultaneously naming the Communist Party as “the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system.” Like the tsarist autocracy before it, the party derived its authority from the political mission it had defined for itself, rather than from the people it claimed to serve.
On paper, the present-day Russian Federation has abandoned this tradition. Its 1993 Constitution recognizes its “multinational people” as “the bearer of sovereignty and the sole source of power,” and regards free elections as the highest expression of that power. In practice, however, elections have become a ritual that displays power rather than a contest that decides it.
In the state’s 2024 presidential election, President Vladimir Putin received eighty-seven percent of the vote after the anti-war candidates Boris Nadezhdin and Ekaterina Duntsova were barred from running by the Central Election Commission. Less than a month before the vote, Alexy Navanly, an opposition leader and critic of Mr. Putin, passed away in an Arctic penal colony, where he was serving a nineteen-year sentence on extremism charges. It appears, then, that it is not ‘free and fair’ elections involving open dialogue with opposition that buttresses the modern government’s sovereignty. The Kremlin of today grounds its legitimacy in the same mission of national greatness and expansion as its predecessors. In 2022, Mr. Putin compared his invasion of Ukraine to Peter the Great’s conquests, declaring that “it also fell to us to return” Russian land.
Common Thread: The Rulers Know Best
Although a Christian monarch, an atheist communist state, and a nationalist government could hardly look more different, they shared a similar understanding regarding the relationship between rulers and citizens. In each era, the rulers of Russia have believed that they know better than the people what is in their best interest. In particular, there are three mechanisms that carry this idea from one regime to another. First, each regime relied on a political police force to consolidate their power: the tsar’s Okhrana, the Soviet Cheka and the Committee for State Security (KGB), and today’s Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB)—the KGB’s direct successor. Second, elected bodies in these regimes, from the tsar’s Duma, the Soviet’s single-candidate elections, to today’s managed presidential elections, are treated as tools to confirm decisions that have already been made. Third, Russia’s vast and multinational territory consists of people who never agreed to be governed together. With mismatched interest among the people, the state could never be justified by the unified will of all its people. Therefore, keeping the empire together and enlarging it became the mission of the rulers. Gaining territory, from the tsar’s conquests to the contemporary invasion of Ukraine, thus shows that each regime is content upon fulfilling its asserted missions without regard to the consent or interests of its populace.
Political policing, ceremonial elections, and imperial expansion have lasting consequences. At home, opposition is considered a form of betrayal, and critics are often labeled ‘foreign agents.’ Abroad, the Kremlin can use war to build its authority without the concern of having to bear audience costs, which leaves Russia’s neighbours exposed to the ambitions of whoever holds power in Moscow. For ordinary Russians, it means that they have to bear the costs of missions they were never asked to approve—whichever objecting parties risking deportation or prosecution.
Russia’s history shows that changing the form of government and or the color of politcal ideology doesn’t necessarily change the source of authority. Every new regime claimed to break with the past, yet each inherited the assumption that the sovereign, not the citizen, decides what the nation needs. This explains why elections in Russia have functioned to display rather than transfer power. Voting can only provide legitimacy when the ones with the power acknowledge the voters’ right to choose. Since the 1993 Constitution already calls the people the sole source of power, what Russia lacks is not the right wording on paper. Unless a future Russian state accepts that its citizens can judge their own interest, a new constitution will fall into the same trap that changes text without effecting reform.
Edited by Mathilde Belin.
The argument defended in this article is solely that of the author and does not reflect the position of the McGill Journal of Political Science, the Political Science Students’ Association, or the Political Science Department.
Featured image by Andrew Shiva
