1
0
From November 10 to 21, over 56,000 delegates from 193 countries convened in Belém, Brazil, for the thirtieth annual Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). At COP30, these delegates planned future emissions reductions, reflected on progress, and negotiated on financial aid, aiming to create economic benefits while also encouraging green progress. However, the progress of the conference has been marred by the absence of a high-level delegation from the United States, as well as by President Trump’s shift away from climate policy toward the deregulation of fossil fuels, including a controversial re-withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement. Despite appearances by high-profile American political figures in Belém – such as California Governor Gavin Newsom – the lack of official representation from Washington has the potential to complicate international agreements, which are heavily reliant on collective action. As the world’s second-largest carbon emitter and leader of the current international order, the U.S.’s noncompliance with climate agreements may lead to major setbacks to global cooperation, dampening the benefits of agreements reached at COP30. In the meantime, China and other developing nations are backfilling the U.S.’s truancy, taking up leadership roles that will have considerable impacts on future world order dynamics. As the policy negotiated in Brazil begins to be implemented, the Trump administration is walking a fine line between pursuing its own interests in fossil fuels while maintaining its international legitimacy and status as a global hegemon.
American Actions Regarding Climate
In stark contrast to the current negotiations in Belém, the U.S. under President Trump’s administration has slowly drifted away from climate commitments, denoting climate change as a “con job” while simultaneously upscaling fossil fuel industry operations. In terms of international diplomacy, in addition to the U.S. absence from COP30, Washington has once again withdrawn from the Paris Agreement and all other accords under the UNFCCC. Further, policies were established domestically to cut development in the wind and electric vehicle sectors, increase Alaskan oil and gas drilling, and lift restrictions on liquified natural gas exports. This marks additional increases in the dismantling of climate policy compared to President Trump’s first term, potentially rooted in a favoring of the fossil fuel corporations that helped fund his campaign.
Economically, the U.S.’s absence from COP30 and the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the green energy market have led some to believe that these actions pose a self-inflicted threat, as this market space is indirectly ceded to China. However, Washington’s actions reflect President Trump’s perspective on the future of energy: developing nations lack the capacity to pivot to green energy, and fossil fuels will remain economically viable. Because the U.S. is currently the world’s largest producer of oil and gas, a continued focus on these advantages would enable it to compete widely with China’s renewable energy market. The Trump administration’s economic strategy has resulted in the instatement of $40 billion in subsidies for fossil fuels since his inauguration, signaling a likely continual shift away from climate policy for the rest of his term.
American Withdrawal’s Effect on Global Efforts
The American withdrawal from COP30 and continued expansion into fossil fuel industries will have severe implications for the future of international cooperation in mitigating climate change. Washington’s aggressive policy shifts, aimed at undoing Biden-era climate regulations, have eroded the United States’ international credibility, with many developing states viewing U.S. climate efforts as politically dependent and fleeting. The U.S.’s consistent policy reversals under partisan administrations have caused international actors to view its climate leadership as inherently unstable, setting the stage for other states to gain agency in climate decisions. Given the substantial market share of green technology it already possesses and its demonstrated willingness to finance developing nations, these uncertainties could signal an international shift towards China as the primary leader of climate diplomacy.
China’s emergence was already visible throughout COP30, as the Brazilians emphasized China’s comparatively greater role in facilitating agreements over the COP30 agenda compared to previous events. Even prior to the conference, Beijing has worked to set aside individual differences with Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa in particular, forming the BRICS coalition to take on greater climate leadership roles. In Belém, China has also focused on framing itself as a developing nation and negotiating on behalf of other Global South countries. At the conference, COP30 President André Corrêa praised China for adding “scale and technology” to the green energy transition, driving down the costs of green infrastructure and making solutions more affordable for other developing countries. In addition, Chinese companies have continued to fund abatement efforts in emerging economies, investing $220 billion in green technology since 2022 across 54 countries, 75 per cent of which are developing nations. Contrasting these commitments with the Trump administration’s retreat to traditional energy markets and the adverse effects these fuels have, particularly on the Global South, China appears poised to take the reins of international climate policy efforts if Washington persists on its current path.
Climate Coordinator, or Hegemonic Challenger?
On a larger scale, China’s actions to fill the void left by declining American international climate efforts point towards shifting dynamics in the liberal world order. As a revisionist state, many have pointed towards China as not necessarily seeking domination on the global stage, but rather progressively undermining American hegemony through soft balancing1. Because the Chinese are certainly unable to challenge the U.S. through a direct hegemonic conflict, their grand strategy has revolved around working within existing international structures while simultaneously developing its own institutions. By aligning itself with green innovation and spurring the growth of emerging economies through these technologies, China will be able to increase its influence among developing nations in the long term, ultimately seeking to challenge the U.S.-led international system through a potential coalition of Global South states, a strategy already manifesting itself in BRICS.
Beijing’s actions at COP30, and the climate policy sphere as a whole, have reflected their grand strategy, as their support of developing nations and increased leadership in climate proposals will enhance their power without requiring head-on confrontation with the U.S. By heightening its legitimacy with other states while simultaneously limiting U.S. opportunities to leverage its power within the climate sector, China can set the foundation for its eventual revisionist system to one day challenge the American-led world order. To counter this rapidly expanding influence, the Trump administration should remain involved in climate negotiations, both at COP30 and beyond. Because revisionism will fill any vacancies in policymaking, the pressure is on Washington to reclaim its legitimacy in the international climate sphere and restore investments in green technology, not just for the future of the environment, but for its future as a global hegemon.
Edited by Matteo de Campos Mello Grijns
The argument defended in this article is solely that of the author and does not reflect the position of the McGill Journal of Political Science, the Political Science Students’ Association, or the McGill Department of Political Science.
Featured image by wikicommon
- Soft balancing is a state’s use of non military factors (diplomacy, economic sanctions, international organizations) to increase the costs of unilateral action for a stronger state. ↩︎
