Georgia’s Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, a member of the Georgian Dream party, shocked the nation by announcing that EU accession would be postponed for at least four more years. This announcement ignited popular protests in Tbilisi, revealing the rapid transformation of Georgia’s foreign policy. Despite popular support for EU accession, the ruling Georgian Dream party has favoured strengthening ties with Russia and China. From “Kremlin-like” laws to forging a strategic partnership with China, Georgia’s foreign alliances are undergoing a significant realignment. A recalibration towards alternative alliances thus raises questions about Georgia’s future in the EU and its democratic trajectory on the international stage.
Context
Georgia, once a strong pro-EU advocate in the post-Soviet region, has increasingly gravitated towards Moscow’s orbit, under the ruling Georgian Dream party. The party’s controversial grip on power—already tainted by allegations of electoral misconduct in October 2024— has broken away from popular domestic aspirations by halting European Union accession for the next four years, accusing the EU of blackmailing Georgia into a decision. The move was further solidified by the inauguration of Mikheil Kavelashvili, a hardline critic of the West, as president. His rise to power, amid mass protests in Tbilisi, marks a break from the country’s long-standing ambition of joining the European Union. This shift directly contradicts public sentiment with pre-election polling indicating that nearly 80 per cent of the population favoured accession, a goal that is even enshrined in the country’s constitution.
As unrest grows, Georgia’s foreign policy is rapidly pivoting away from Europe, strengthening ties with Russia and China, marking a shift in the country’s geopolitical future.
Breaking Away from Tradition
Since the Georgian Dream party came to power in 2012, Georgia has increasingly aligned itself with the “axis of evasion”—Russia, China, and Iran. In its pursuit of alternative markets, Georgia has slowly moved away from the EU’s economic guarantees in favour of new independent partners. Russia has emerged as a leading partner in this shift.
While Georgia has not resumed formal diplomatic ties with Russia since the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, it has pursued indirect engagement. The Georgian Dream government has quietly expanded economic and humanitarian ties with Moscow, reflecting a strategic pivot that mirrors Russia’s domestic approaches . This alignment became evident when Georgia refused to join Western sanctions against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine —a decision which strained its relations with Kyiv. President Zelinsky notably accused Tbilisi of aiding the Russian war effort, prompting Ukraine to recall its ambassadors.
More broadly, Georgia’s recent shift toward autocracy helps explain its pro-Russian stance. The Georgian Dream party has capitalized on the trauma of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, positioning itself as the protector of the Georgian people. The party’s approach has built a narrative around the “fear of war,” to address the people of the breakaway Russian republic of South Ossetia and, by extension, Moscow. The rhetoric, then, can be seen as part of a trend which sees illiberal figures in Western countries who feel it preferable to make peace with Russia rather than to fight it.
Georgia’s pro-Russian shift is increasingly codified in Kremlin-like autocratic laws. The “foreign agent” bill, passed in May 2024, is similar to Russian media and free speech legislation. The bill requires non-governmental and media organizations receiving more than 20 per cent of their funding from abroad to register as “pursuing the interests of a foreign power”—a move seen as an attempt to silence government critics and suppress independent journalism. By stifling dissent and tightening state control, the legislation further weakens Georgia’s democratic institutions, making EU integration increasingly unlikely. Instead, the country’s realignment appears to favour ties with Russia. While Georgio-Russian relations are likely to grow in upcoming years, it seems the country has increasingly given China its attention.
A Strategic Partnership: China
While Georgia has long partnered with Russia, to varying extents, China has rapidly gained importance in the country’s foreign interests, mainly because the Asian giant presents novel economic potential.
The improvement in bilateral relations between Tbilisi and Beijing mainly stems from China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), where Georgia’s strategic location between Asia and Europe has positioned it as a key transit hub in the so-called ‘middle corridor.’ Since signing a free-trade agreement with China, Georgia has expanded economic cooperation with Beijing, significantly increasing levels of trade. With China expanding its cross-continental plan and Georgia forming ties with the world’s second largest economy, both parties see an advantage in deepening their relationship.
Along with economic rapprochement, Georgia has confirmed its involvement in China’s ‘Global Security Initiative’ (GSI), aimed at strengthening coordination and collaboration in international affairs. The arrangement, which reflects Beijing’s preferred vision of global security, evidenced Tbilisi’s willingness for Sino-Georgian political alignment.
By forging stronger ties with Beijing and Moscow, Georgia risks diplomatic isolation and further undermines its chances of EU accession. The EU has already raised concerns over the country’s democratic backsliding, pointing to creeping autocracy and restrictions on civil society. But is Georgia simply diversifying its foreign policy, or is it deliberately turning away from Europe? Can it maintain ties with both China and Russia while still keeping its EU ambitions alive, or is this balancing act unsustainable?
A Challenged Future
Under the Georgian Dream party, Tbilisi’s geopolitical interests have been reshaped. While the country’s population remains staunchly in favour of EU accession, its leaders have instead distanced themselves from the Western political sphere, seeking economic opportunities with the “axis of evasion.”While EU suspicions regarding Georgia’s alliance with autocracies and its systematic democratic backsliding have diminished its accession possibilities, Georgia may find success in further allying with China. Unlike Russia, which faces trade restrictions from Europe, China and Europe are becoming increasingly interdependent. Georgia’s strategic position as a “middle corridor” may allow it to capitalize on this growing relationship, potentially prompting the EU to reconsider its stance and become more receptive to Georgia’s demands.
Edited by Samrawit Terrefe
The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and they do not reflect the position of the McGill Journal of Political Science or the Political Science Students’ Association.