In early January this year, 150 Guatemalan and eight Salvadoran military officers landed in Haiti as part of the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) to combat the country’s soaring gang violence. The mission, led by Kenya and sponsored by the U.S., is a response to former prime minister Ariel Henry’s request for international assistance in October 2022. Almost two years later, in September 2024,  400 Kenyan officers were stationed in Haiti to work alongside the Haitian National Police (HPN). Nearing the seventh month since troops first arrived, the mission has seen little to no progress in quelling the ongoing violence or easing the humanitarian crisis facing the country.

A Situation Getting Worse

The last year has been marked by unprecedented levels of violence at the hands of Haiti’s gangs. According to UN figures, over 5600 Haitians were killed by gang violence in 2024, a 20% increase from 2023. Haiti has experienced a surge in gang violence since the 2021 assassination of the country’s president Jovenal Moïse. In March of 2024, the acting prime minister who preceded Moïse, Ariel Henry, was forced to step down after gangs threatened to wage a ‘civil war’ unless he resigned. Since March, gang leaders have seized control of over 90% of the capital. 

In December, more than 200 people were killed in Haiti’s portside neighborhood Cite Soleil in a massacre that primarily targeted the elderly. Later that month, thousands fled the capital along the Kenscoff-Marigot road, a dangerous mountain trail that has become a primary escape route for residents, where gangs have cut off roads, sea routes, and shut down the international airport. The number of internally displaced people in Haiti has tripled over the past year now surpassing 1 million. Compounding this crisis is the lack of social services and essential resources for those surviving in displacement sites. The gang alliance known as G9 Family and Allies took control of Haiti’s main fuel port in 2024, depriving hospitals of fuel supplies needed to generate power.

Operational Challenges

The force of Haiti’s gangs, who have recently unified among factions, has overwhelmed Haitian Police and MSS operations. One of the central issues with the MSS has been the lack of funding behind the mission. The underfunding has brought wide hesitation among pledged countries to deploy troops. Of the 2500 personnel pledged to join in assisting the HPN, only 572 are currently deployed. The HNP has been a noticeably weak institution, where some 900 officers fled the country during 2023. The dwindling number of police officers has demonstrated the urgent need for assistance by a stronger global force. 

Haiti, Kenya, and U.S. officials have requested converting the MSS into a UN peacekeeping operation, a proposal that has been highly contentious given the marred history of foreign intervention in Haiti. The MINUSTAH mission, introduced in 2004 to address armed conflicts after the toppling of President Aristide, was responsible for the subsequent cholera outbreak and a number of sexual abuse cases. In November 2024, the resolution to transform the mission was shot down by China and Russia. China’s ambassador, Zhang Jun, pointed to the need to tackle the root causes of Haiti’s instability and divert global focus to internal affairs. To this, Haiti’s ambassador, Antonio Rodrigued stated that a peacekeeping operation would allow Haiti to restore “the rule of law”, along with peace and security. 

Internal Roadblocks 

The rise in Haiti’s gangs did not occur in a vacuum. With the collapse of social and educational institutions, gang membership has become increasingly common for children living in poverty. In November 2024 UNICEF reported a 70% increase in the number of children recruited by gangs compared to the previous year. 

Gang organizations in Haiti are political as well as they are criminal. The employment of gangs by political and society elites is deep-seated in Haiti’s history, dating back to the time of François Duvalier’s dictatorship in 1957. Since Moïse’s assassination in 2021, the proliferation of hang membership has developed alongside ongoing inadequacy in Haiti’s political and public security sectors. 

The corruption and instability of Haiti’s government has eroded their legitimacy to the public. In October of 2024, three out of the nine members of the transitional presidential council were accused of bribery by an anti-corruption agency in Haiti. In November 2024, only six months after taking over for Ariel Henry, council president Garry Conille was ousted from power. 

A Path Forward

Given the link between Haiti’s past of foreign intervention and corrupt governance, any external efforts to strengthen the country’s state power will be difficult to achieve. While many agree that Haiti’s local government cannot go without aid, there is also a demand that foreign assistance not come at the isolation of local agencies and civil society. Where intervention forces have solely cooperated with elites in the past, an investment in working with civil society institutions may facilitate trust in peacekeeping and future leadership. 

The provisional government is tasked with holding a democratic election by February 2026, which will mark a decade after the last presidential election. With the MSS extended until October 2nd, 2025, critical pressure for  tangible progress remains.  

Edited by Andrea Pupovac

The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and they do not reflect the position of the McGill Journal of Political Science or the Political Science Students’ Association.

Featured Image by Richard Pierrin/ Getty Images