In January 2025, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso will complete their formal withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Founded in 1975, the regional bloc is recognized as the preeminent regional cooperation framework in West Africa. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso aim to form a new Alliance of Sahelian States (AES), abandoning ECOWAS protocols which relate to conflict prevention, peace-keeping, and security mechanisms.This distancing, which began in January 2024, was dubbed  “Sahelexit ” by media outlets and presents a multidimensional threat to the stability and security of an increasingly fragile Sahel region.

Why the exit?

The split from ECOWAS was asserted as a “sovereign decision” by  the three governments of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. This move comes as the result of  shared perceptions of French influence over many ECOWAS policies, including sanctions against juntas in the wake of their coups.  Niger’s general Adbourahmane Tchiani stated the Junta chiefs’ wishes  to build a community “far from the control of foreign powers”, as a reason for this fracture.

For AES leaders, a rejection of West Africa’s former colonial powers, particularly France, is a key part of the rhetoric surrounding their decision to break from ECOWAS. France’s economic involvement in West Africa has been a subject of contention, instituting conversations on the country’s neocolonial role in Françafrique. The franc CFA, common currency of Sahel countries, is under France’s informal influence. As a result, France has faced scrutiny for its alleged prioritization of European interest over the development of African economies. Critics argue that the  currency’s fixed parity with the euro – formerly French franc– stifles the competitiveness of  exporting companies, handicapping domestic producers, and limiting economic diversification. While ECOWAS has announced the launch of a new domestic currency, the eco, which is set to take effect in 2027, there is little indication that this timetable will be met. 

The economic breakaway is a part of a broader shift. Following the 2024 BRICS summit, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have expressed interest to join the BRICS alliance (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa)., Hence, the new alliance is looking for a new strategic direction, aimed at diversifying economic partnerships and reducing dependency on the West. 

Beyond  economic policy, the  Junta-run countries– as the result of several coups from 2020 to 2023– are believed to be politically motivated in defying ECOWAS’s calls for a return to democratic rule. In the 1999 protocol, Article 25 affirms the bloc’s opposition to the Juntas, authorizing external interventions “in the event of the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government”. Prior to economic sanctions against juntas in the wake of their coups, ECOWAS policies have always stood firmly against any shift toward a non-democratic agenda.

Worsening Insecurity

By December 2023, all three AES countries had expelled United Nations (UN) and Western counterterrorism forces, particularly in opposition to the French Sabre and Barkhane operations. The Sahel region has been a longstanding strategic locus for Militant Islamist extremism, with various non-state actors claiming affiliation to al Qaeda or the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). The withdrawal of French troops and the rise of military Juntas has left a power vacuum that insurgent groups looking to gain more power can fill.

 Extremist factions have historically exploited inter-communal tensions to stir up social discord, erode public trust in the government, and recruit supporters, highlighting another dangerous opportunity now heightened by the withdrawal. Moreover, the perceived inability of ECOWAS to address the deteriorating security situation could serve as justification for military coups, as seen in AES countries. ECOWAS counterterrorism mechanisms such as the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Bureau, and the Counter-Terrorism Training Centre have been limited  in their capacity due to financial constraints,  lack of commitment from member states, and political pushback against UN involvement.

Since 2020, violence involving militant Islamist groups in the Sahel has surged, with a 90 percent increase in fatalities and a 130 percent rise in violent incidents. AES countries have experienced the largest escalation of violence of any region in Africa. The last decade of violence has displaced 2.6 million people in the borderlands of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, with Burkina seeing roughly ten percent of its population displaced from their homes due to jihadist violence.

The multilateral withdrawal entails the potential collapse of controlled and safe migration within the Sahel. Without the bloc’s influence over AES countries, coordinated migration strategies could end up dissolved, potentially leading to uncontrolled flows of migration that would increase security risks, further destabilizing the regions.  

Fear of Spillover To Western Coast

Amid the shifting security trend following the “Sahelexit”, a growing fear of spillover from  Jihadist violence and political upheavals  into neighboring states has taken over politics in the region. Over the past two years, violent incidents linked to militant Islamist groups have surged by more than 250 percent within 50 kilometers of the Sahel’s borders. In 2024, the recorded fatalities in Benin have doubled with a similar rise in Togo. In addition, Mali has reported two dozen incidents within 50km of the borders of Mauritania, Senegal, and Guinea, regions in which there was little to no Jihadist activity. With the aim of creating its own security framework, AES has also withdrawn from the G5 – a collaborative task force established to collect and share security information. Military leaders of Burkina Faso and Niger have accused the G5 force of failing to improve Sahel’s security and of catering foreign interests. Few details are known about the new AES security plan. According to a statement in March by Niger’s junta chief, the new force will be “operational as soon as possible”. 

Militant Violence

Alongside rising extremist violence, the militarization of the AES is a security threat of its own. Just one month after France withdrew its last troops in December of 2023, Russia’s Africa Corps landed in Burkina Faso, capitalizing on the absence of Western involvement. The Wagner Group has managed to expand its influence into Niger and Mali, which now increasingly depend on Russian military companies to address their internal security needs. 

However, the very provision of this newfound security forces has been called into question by the violent crackdowns of Junta and Wagner militaries. In March of 2022, a UN report revealed that soldiers and Wagner mercenaries killed around 500 people, mainly civilians, in Moura, Mali’s capital. While the Malian military denied this charge, similar accusations of military violence emerged in Burkina Faso, where Juntas have reportedly  conscripted their critics to the front. The exponential surge of violence across West Africa is demanding urgent dialogue and cooperation between ECOWAS and AES leaders. Ghana’s President, Nana Anufo-Addo expressed hope of Mali’s, Niger and Burkina Faso’s return to the ECOWAS bloc. Nevertheless, the growing polarity between AES and ECOWAS countries casts a shadow over a possible reconciliation, leaving the region’s diplomatic future and security uncertain.

Edited by Andrea Pupovac

The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and they do not reflect the position of the McGill Journal of Political Science or the Political Science Students’ Association.

Featured image by Associated Press