This month, the Taliban will attend the 2024 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), not as a member of the general assembly, but as an “observational body,” a status similar to that of Palestine and Vatican City at the UN. The Taliban will not hold the same rights and responsibilities1 as member-states but will have the ability to “participate in periphery discussions and potentially hold bilateral meetings” (Yawar, Greenfield, Dickie, 2024). COP29 will be the first instance of Afghan presence at a United Nations summit since the UN “deferred consideration” of their participation in 2021 (Yawar, Greenfield, Dickie, 2024). Even with their action potential limited, their presence at such a crucial global event represents a potentially critical juncture for the conceptual understanding of what a state is, with the unprecedented inclusion of a non-state2 militant actor within formal international political institutions and procedures. 

Conceptualizing the Normative State: The Treaty of Westphalia  

Our modern conception of the nation-state is generally considered as emerging from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years’ War in Europe. The Treaty would cease this intra-continental expansion war between Catholic and Protestant forces through the state’s normative internalization3 of sovereignty. Out of a “loose band of irregular entities” emerged a (more) stable, geographically fixed conception of the European continent, and the theoretical4 pillars of independence and non-interference we recognize as integral in modern intra-state relations (Schrijver, 67). The enshrinement of formal nation-statehood in Europe would vitally reshape its political landscape towards fixed regional autonomy from more ambiguous territorial divides and rule, while paradoxically, it launched and intensified its settler and extractive projects in the ‘New World’, Asia, Africa, and Oceania. Europe would grant its own nations the newfound privileges of unchallenged autonomy – its increasingly powerful and technically skilled nations simultaneously enacting infringement and disempowerment elsewhere whilst boasting their newly theorized right to national self-determination. 

Today, international law is compelled to acknowledge the “primordial” rights of the nation-state; the current conception of which evolves from the ideals put forth in Westphalia, valorizing the right to absolute and complete control over territory under state authority (Brown, 305). The nation-state thus becomes theorized as an autonomous, individual, rational actor which behaves on its own accord, whilst following certain guiding principles laid out through international law. The global landscape may be one of inherent anarchy, in which a lack of centralized order allows each state to assert its independence and absolute sovereignty, but such chaos is thus theoretically mitigated through a logic of internal state coherence. This ideal type, fitted for the officialized states of the West, remains unfit to adapt itself to regions which functionally possess pseudo-governments and are highly reliant on the informal realm.

As nation-states regulate and review their legitimacy through continued acceptance within the international system, the best indicator often being considered such an actor and maintaining that status is one’s presence within international bodies5. The consensus of a nation’s ‘success’ in embodying principles of statehood is thus determined through its ability to fit within the parameters set out by the ‘global’ community; an ‘international’ community which is more of a manifestation of Western globalization of their ideology6 than it is an organically emergent sense of ideological and practical unity. 

There is a certain irony in Western-dominated political bodies possessing the right to include or exclude the voice of a given nation in such proceedings based on their ability to fit within the confines of their formulation of political authority and sovreignty when they have set the definitions and create loopholes to justify their expansionism, spanning from Christian expansionism in the initial colonial period to democratization in the era of neo-colonialism. The case of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 shows Western nations are still unaware of the irony they display toward their ideals of sovereignty when they intervene in nations they deem undeserving of state respect. 

The Implications of Taliban Presence and Afghan Representation at COP29 

COP29 represents an unprecedented shift away from the logic of disregard that has thus far been applied to interactions with the Taliban. Afghanistan is one of the most vulnerable nations to the effects of climate change, whilst ranking among the lowest global carbon emitters (Stefansson, 2024). In a way, it seems the situation of state-specific crisis has justified an exception to the rule. The value of Afghan representation in climate forums is critical as the country faces extreme consequences due to the climate crisis and has likely incentivized the international community to forego their reluctance of the Taliban’s governance while their violation of human rights has never been worse. 

While they will not possess voting or meaningful participation power, their presence at the event alone challenges the historical requirements of recognized statehood in ‘proper’ procedure, and, the previously established criteria used in the ascription of such status. The Taliban is, in many ways, antithetical to the pillars of state recognition forged out of the Treaty of Westphalia. While the Taliban utilizes coercive force and wields control over violence within their territory, this violence is not legitimized through the backing of bureaucratic and state apparatuses, which are pillars of the justificatory apparatus of the Westphalian state. While they also find some legitimacy in their ability to provide social and material services to the general population, such –varying, unfixed, often emerging from the necessities of survival– support is not regulated by democratic elections or an officialized power structure. Their quasi-acknowledgement at the climate summit, therefore, raises interesting questions regarding the development of the normative underpinnings that govern global relations. In practice, the Taliban’s presence represents a regained sense of much-needed visibility for Afghanistan on the international scale. Simultaneously, many may have concerns regarding the moral implications of allowing such a body to take a step into the formal realm. 

Westphalian Endurance 

In essence, the issue of the Taliban’s presence at the COP29, hosted by the UN, is a contentious one. Their status as an observer of the proceedings raises a series of questions regarding the international system and its right to grant the title of valid statehood. This is true in both explicit and implicit ways: as the UN voiced a hesitation for allowing the Taliban to meaningfully participate in the affair of human rights violations7, one must also question if their disapproval of Afghan representation emerges more so from the nation’s divergence in the presentation of the nation-state. If the Taliban were not responsible for such violations of human rights, would the UN recognize the militant group as a legitimate governing body? One ought to consider if these norms of statehood exist only as an ideal type which dominant forces can weaponize against developing nations because of lingering imperial legacies.

Ultimately, the Westphalian state exists as a perpetual normative ideal that the West historically and currently diverges from at its own will. Non-Western nations, who similarly diverge from its ideals, or develop completely unassociated notions of nation-statehood, however, are ostracized from participation in the international realm. The treaty of 1648 has become socially embedded as a global standard, despite its incompatibility and inadequacy in capturing the diversity of governance structures. In this way, Westphalia is a symbolic marker of Western constructions, while its globalization represents a project of expansionism. Through this lens, the Taliban’s partial allotment of recognition is more of a reminder of their estrangement from the international order than a step towards more pluriversal conceptions of statehood. As observers of the affair, they are reminded that meaningful acceptance within the formal global realm denotes a structural assimilation into Western life ways. 

  1. Voting power, adherence to resolutions, engagement in meaningful collaboration, and promotion of the UN charter. ↩︎
  2. By “non-state”, we here designate political entities which are not recognized as states by Western standards.  ↩︎
  3. In reference to the final stage of the norm cycle: norm emergence, norm cascade, norm internalization. Norm internalization refers to the stage in which a norm has successfully been proposed (emergence) to and widely adopted (cascade) within society, it is internalized when it becomes ‘taken for granted’ and, therefore, a solidified norm. ↩︎
  4. Qua “referring to theory”, not qua “unsure”.  ↩︎
  5. Such as the UN, NATO, etc. ↩︎
  6. In a material and theoretical sense. ↩︎
  7. And, to clarify, this is certainly not an apology for the Taliban – rather an examination of the stories that are presented and the underlying narratives that are hidden. ↩︎

Edited by Sofia V. Forlini

The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and they do not reflect the position of the McGill Journal of Political Science or the Political Science Students’ Association.

Featured image by AP

References:

Aslami, Zarena. “The Second Anglo-Afghan War, or the Return of the Uninvited.” Branch Collective, 2015, branchcollective.org/?ps_articles=zarena-aslami-the-second-anglo-afghan-war-or-the-return-of-the-uninvited.  

Brown, Philip Marshall. “The Theory of the Independence and Equality of States.” The American Journal of International Law 9, no. 2 (1915): 305–35. https://doi.org/10.2307/2187161

Maizland, Lindsay. “The Taliban in Afghanistan .” Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounders, 19 Jan. 2023, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan.  

Medica Mondiale. “Women’s Rights in Afghanistan.” Medica Mondiale, 2022, medicamondiale.org/en/where-we-empower-women/afghanistan#:~:text=In%20the%201970s%2C%20the%20Afghan,on%20the%20rights%20of%20women

Press, The Associated. “The Taliban Will Attend a U.N. Climate Conference for the First Time.” NBC News, NBCUniversal News Group, 11 Nov. 2024, www.nbcnews.com/news/amp/rcna179539.  

Schrijver, Nico. “The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty .” ProQuest, 1999, www.proquest.com/docview/1564013811?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals

Stefansson, Andreas. “Afghanistan: Caught between Climate Change and Global Indifference.” Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 21 Nov. 2024, www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/11/21/afghanistan-caught-between-climate-change-and-global-indifference.  Yawar, Mohammad Y, et al. “Exclusive: Taliban Administration Officials to Attend UN Climate Conference in Azerbaijan | Reuters.” Reuters, 24 Nov. 2024, www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taliban-administration-officials-attend-un-climate-conference-azerbaijan-2024-11-10/.