According to the Pew Research Center, more than half of sufficiently large countries (>500,000 people) around the world today are democracies, and another 46 exhibit some elements of democratic representation. As an inherently humanistic political ideal, modern democratic theory places the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in high order and is understood by the United Nations to be: 

“a set of values and principles that should be followed for greater participation, equality, security and human development.”

In the face of democratic dominance on the world stage, it bears relevance to investigate the original conclusions of thinkers, Aristotle in particular, who are responsible for this regime type’s conceptualization.

Differing conceptions of citizenship

In his seminal Politics, Aristotle details the nature of citizenship within several forms of political association. While citizenship is today conceptualized as stemming from either birth, bloodline, lengthy residence in the same polity, or political participation, Aristotle contends that “the citizen is not a citizen by living in a place,” and that the ability to “be sued or bring lawsuits”1 is not sufficient for the constitution of citizenship either (Aristotle, Politics, III.1 1275A). Here marks our current systems’ first departure from his original understanding of the polity, with Aristotle strictly distinguishing between the physical state and the political association that exercises rule over it. Aristotle’s theory of the state suggests that there are a multitude of persons who live inside the bounds of a nation, and yet do not constitute its citizenry. These people include, among other groups: slaves, resident-aliens, artisans, and marketplace traders. In opposition to the more egalitarian contemporary ideal of democracy, in which all who participate in a societal organization count as its citizens, Aristotle claims, “those things without which the city could not exist are not parts of the organized whole,” clarifying that “not all the things that need to be available to cities ought to be counted as parts of the city” (VII.8 1328A).

While the modern state has all but erased the slave class from its population2, those who could be considered artisans and marketplace traders in the broadest sense are among the most populous in modern democracies. If, to Aristotle, even those individuals are better described as resident aliens than citizens, how should the population of individuals in contemporary nations be classified? 

Citizenship in democracy

In the third book of Politics, Aristotle writes, “. . . a citizen in a democracy most of all. . . is defined by no other single thing more than by taking part in judging and ruling” (III.1 1275A20). The task of judging and ruling, which would constitute the modern-day equivalent of what Aristotle considered to be citizenship-earning behaviour, could only be the right to vote. Through the act of voting, those in a democracy believe themselves capable of expressing their opinions and influencing the government under which they live. Here, however, a crucial distinction must be drawn. Indeed, strictly direct democracy, in which all laws and governmental policies are voted on by citizens, does not truly exist in the modern world. The closest approximation to this system exists in the Swiss Cantons and, to a (much) lesser and infrequent degree, in countries like the United States3, Germany, and Lichtenstein. Representative democracy, whereby individuals vote for intermediaries who will represent their interests in government, is the true dominant regime type in the world today. However, if our political participation is only in electing intermediaries, can we, in Aristotelian terms, legitimately call ourselves citizens? 

One may raise the argument that voting for a representative constitutes judging and ruling. However, it is clear from electoral gaming4 that those representatives must only convince the wider public that they will, in fact, achieve constituent ends in order to be elected. When those representatives have attained political office, they are under no obligation, legal or otherwise, to keep their promise and carry out the will of their constituents; with this, they are not required to fulfill the Aristotelian requirement for citizenship. Further, and most decisively, two operative terms for the nature of citizen rule are provided by Aristotle in book III. The judging and ruling must be of “deliberative and judicial” form, and while voting could arguably constitute deliberation, no such rights to interpret law5 are afforded to any non-elected individuals in modern democracies (III.1 1275B20) .

The final question6

A crucial question arises after realizing that, in Aristotelian terms, the vast majority of individuals within our modern states are not citizens. What does this entail for the way we conceptualize and understand our political system? What label would Aristotle ascribe to our form of political association? If there is democracy whenever “those who are free and poor […] are in authority in ruling offices,” we cannot faithfully describe our contemporary political regimes as democratic– the poorest classes are among the least influential in our modern democracies, and the richest among the most (IV.4 1290B10). Two alternate forms, aristocracy, the rule of the most virtuous, and oligarchy, the rule of the most privileged, both seem to be better descriptors of a citizenry formed of a few powerful individuals. It may seem appropriate to choose aristocracy as those elected citizens could be considered as having been chosen as the “best among us.” 

The reader should be wary, however, of describing our politicians as most virtuous: it would take a normative analysis beyond the scope of this article to decide whether politicians are, on average, the most virtuous of individuals in the state. What is clear, however, is that the most influential class of elected officials are exponentially wealthier than the average voter.7 Additionally, the process by which elected officials transition into high-paying roles in the private sector, colloquially referred to as the “revolving door,” is highly documented within the United States, especially. It seems that our politics are set up in such a manner that even those with claim to citizenship, as described by Aristotle, are willing to forfeit that status in favor of lucrative non-citizen roles–quite indicative of our oligarchic values.

You, the reader, are left to decide which regime type most represents our political association. But in the eyes of a thinker foundational to Western political theory, whatever we are is not a democracy.

Edited by Sofia V. Forlini

The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and they do not reflect the position of the McGill Journal of Political Science or the Political Science Students’ Association.

Featured image by papazachariasas, obtained through pixabay

  1. Note that, in ancient Athens, juries were one of the primary modes of democratic activity and behaviour, as they often counted up to five hundred members, taken from the citizenry. This suggests that, in this quoted passage, Aristotle is not solely referring to behaviour in law courts, but also to other forms of political behaviour. ↩︎
  2. Or, at least, slavery in the way it was understood in the ancient hellenic world. Modern slavery exists, but it tends to be more pernicious, e.g. this story by Amnesty International. ↩︎
  3. State referendums through which individuals can propose specific legislation  does exist, however they are quite limited in scope and frequency. ↩︎
  4. Using rhetoric to convince constituents that they hold similar political values when one’s true goal is the accumulation of power through elected office. ↩︎
  5. One may argue that serving on juries fulfills this role although jury service entails the power to decide whether acts fall into legal categories and not on the nature of the laws themselves. ↩︎
  6. Or, at least, for this essay. ↩︎
  7.  Within Canada and the United States, as an example. ↩︎