0
0
On February 16th, 2026, Prime Minister Carney announced Canada’s first Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS). This strategy –aiming to strengthen security, create prosperity, and reinforce strategic autonomy–will come with one hundred twenty-five thousand high-paying careers, an increase in Canada’s defence exports by fifty per cent, and a rise in the share of defence acquisitions awarded to Canadian firms to seventy per cent and a jump in Canadian defence industry revenues by two hundred forty per cent.
Mr. Carney states, “The world is changing rapidly. The international rules-based order is fading, and technological change is expanding the fields of conflict.” In response, he suggests Canada should now focus on rebuilding, rearming, and reinvesting in the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canada’s defence procurement has long been too complicated, too slow, and too reliant on international suppliers, limiting the growth of our defence industries.”
Canada’s DIS frames sovereignty as an industrial question: what must Canada’s military do to design, build, maintain, and supply itself at home? However, the country’s bold strategy under Mr. Carney’s leadership has raised concerns about whether industrial and economic ambition is being prioritized over military effectiveness. Critics question whether Canada, as a middle power deeply embedded in its alliances, especially with the US hegemon, can realistically pursue greater industrial self-sufficiency without undermining the very partnerships that have long underpinned its security.
Build-Partner-Buy Approach
At the core of the DIS is the “Build-Partner-Buy” approach, a hierarchical system that prioritizes domestic production in Canadian defence. Under this model, the default is to build domestically, prioritizing Canadian firms for major defence acquisitions. Where domestic capacity is lacking, the government will partner with trusted allies and multinational firms, often through governmental arrangements and co-production agreements. When neither domestic production nor multinational partnership is feasible, Canada will buy directly from foreign suppliers, typically with conditions attached to ensure reinvestment into the Canadian defence industry.
In practice, this framework is implemented through five pillars: renewing the government’s relationship with industry; pursuing strategic procurement through the new Defence Investment Agency and the Build-Partner-Buy model; investing deliberately to strengthen innovation in key defence sectors; securing supply chains for critical inputs such as advanced technologies and minerals; and working closely with domestic partners, including in Canada’s North and Arctic, where sovereignty concerns are heightened.
Breaking Away from US dependency
The development of the DIS reflects a more profound rupture in Canada–US relations. For decades, Canadian security rested on the assumption that the United States would serve as both an economic and military partner. This assumption has been institutionalized through bilateral treaties, shared supply chains, and consistent cooperation between the two nations. However, in recent moments, that significant foundation has weakened. President Trump’s “fifty-first state” remarks and renewed protectionist rhetoric have unsettled Ottawa and the public alike. Prime Minister Mark Carney has called these comments disrespectful, unhelpful, and a disregard for Canada’s sovereignty.
Additionally, Mr. Trump’s military threats neglect Article 5 of NATO, which states, “an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all.” However, Mr. Trump’s rhetoric has stretched beyond the military sphere, with the US president claiming he would rely on “economic force” to absorb the nation as a “fifty-first state.” Public opinion has also been affected by Trump’s threats, with recent polling suggesting that only nine per cent of Canadians now view the United States as a trustworthy ally.
Although DIS aims to distance Canada from US dependence, Canada’s defence architecture remains deeply intertwined with Washington. The North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) operates as a binational command responsible for continental air and missile defence. Additionally, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) anchors Canada within a collective security framework in the Euro-Atlantic, while the Five Eyes partnership binds Canada to intelligence-sharing networks. Finally, the 1956 Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) – a bilateral treaty between the US and Canada – effectively treats Canadian firms as part of the U.S. domestic defence industrial base, allowing them to bypass “Buy American” restrictions, bringing the two nations’ suppliers together through contracts based on mutually beneficial terms and conditions. The DIS therefore emerges from a structural paradox: Canada seeks greater autonomy in procurement and industrial capacity while still relying on deeply integrated North American defence institutions and supply chains.
The Indo-Pacific Gap in Canada’s DIS
A further limitation of the DIS lies in its geographic focus. If the DIS is intended as a genuine “paradigm shift,” it must incorporate a stronger Indo-Pacific dimension. The Indo-Pacific is where defence demand is rising fastest, supply chains are being reconfigured, and where trusted co-production partnerships offer the scale and innovation Canada seeks. For one, Japan is dramatically expanding its defence spending in long-range strike, cyber, and space capabilities. Furthermore, South Korea has emerged as one of the world’s fastest-growing defence exporters.
Additionally, Australia’s AUKUS-driven modernization is reshaping its industrial base in submarines and advanced undersea systems. These countries are natural partners for Canada, yet the DIS’s export strategy emphasizes Europe and the United Kingdom, leaving Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific largely absent, despite the region currently undergoing notable growth. Southeast Asian states alone increased defence spending and research and development by two point seven billion dollars between 2022 and 2024. While the DIS commits to expanding exports through dedicated “Deal Teams,” more trade envoys, and a more substantial global presence, it risks undershooting its own ambitions if it fails to align Canada’s industrial strategy with this area of future defence growth. For a middle power seeking diversification beyond the United States, the Indo-Pacific cannot remain peripheral to Canada.
The Risks at the Heart of Canada’s DIS
Many experts in defence and policy have expressed further concerns about the ambitious DIS. Patrick Lennox, former Royal Canadian Mounted Police intelligence manager, argues that Canada is attempting something historically rare: the construction of a sovereign defence industrial base capable of supplying the material needed to defend the country from direct attack. However, given Canada’s troubled procurement record, success will depend on discipline from both sides. First, the government must provide reliable demand; second, the industry must deliver reliable supply. If profit-seeking overtakes the strategic purpose of DIS, the effort could devolve into an inefficient military-industrial complex rather than a source of sovereignty for Canada.
National Security expert Wesley Wark similarly highlights the strategy’s expansive scope, identifying ten priority sectors, many in high-technology fields. He explains that some of these sectors, such as drones, sensors, and even space platforms, remain aspirational and have yet to be fully realized. According to Mr. Wark, the DIS signals that Canada is “open for business” –to invest and to manufacture– and signals clear economic benefits to the country. Wendy Gilmour, however, cautions that the strategy’s rhetoric of “security, sovereignty and prosperity” may lean too heavily toward economic opportunity at a moment when operational gaps are acute. Arctic surveillance, precision munitions, cyber capabilities, and integrated air and missile defence require rapid, disciplined procurement and not a decade-long defence strategy. Gilmour tells us, “The real test of the DIS will be whether it translates into rapid, disciplined procurement decisions that deliver usable capability to the Canadian Armed Forces.”
Other critics of the DIS argue that its “Build-Partner-Buy” hierarchy risks sacrificing military effectiveness for domestic industry priorities. Commentator Andrew Coyne argues that procurement should follow one simple rule: source from whoever can deliver the best equipment at the lowest cost and in the shortest time, regardless of nationality. While limited domestic production may be justified in emergencies or when supply-chain resilience is critical, as during the COVID-19 pandemic, he argues that such exceptions should be examined on a case-by-case basis. The default, particularly in a deteriorating security environment, should be open competition and diversified sourcing among trusted allies rather than an automatic preference for Canadian firms.
The Future of DIS
In light of these critiques, it is important to recognize the ambitious nature of Canada’s DIS. This strategy is singlehandedly attempting to reshape the nation’s relationship with security, domestic industry, and sovereignty. However, as the Carney government is putting forward such a bold policy, it will surely face its critics, especially regarding the limits of middle-power autonomy. Canada is still deeply embedded in integrated supply chains and collective security agreements that cannot be simply disentangled.
The challenge moving forward will be to balance competing imperatives. If DIS becomes a domestic economic development program, it risks diverting valuable resources from equipping the Canadian Armed Forces with the capabilities they need. If implemented transparently and with a focus on operational requirements, this could strengthen the DIS, Canada’s industrial base, and its armed forces. The success of the strategy will not be measured by export figures or job creation in itself. We have to assess whether it delivers a more capable military, a more reliable defence industry, and a Canada better prepared to navigate a world where security and sovereignty are increasingly threatened, in a world order where the hegemonic position of the US grows contested.
Edited by Catvy Tran
The argument defended in this article is solely that of the author and does not reflect the position of the McGill Journal of Political Science, the Political Science Students’ Association, or the McGill Department of Political Science.
Featured Image by Daniel Torok
.jpg){kind=link}
