Over the past decade, the private military company known as the Wagner Group has been acting as a Russian proxy force in key geopolitical areas, including Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. As a private enterprise, the Wagner Group allowed Russia to quickly expand its influence abroad while maintaining “plausible deniability” about illegal activities. However, following Wagner’s 2023 mutiny in Ukraine and the subsequent death of its leaders, the Russian government has had to assume a more direct role in the paramilitary group’s operations. This shift has complicated Russia’s claims of detachment from Wagner’s actions on the international stage, undermining the flexibility previously afforded by this proxy.
The Formation and Rise of the Wagner Group
The Wagner Group was established in 2014 by Dmitry Utkin, a former Russian intelligence officer, and Yevgeny Prigozhin, an oligarch close to the Kremlin. That same year, Wagner’s first major operation took place during Russia’s initial incursion into Ukraine, aiming to annex the Donbas region. Wagner reported to both Russian intelligence agencies and the national military, cementing its ties to the state.Though widely understood as a private military company, Wagner operated outside official registries, technically violating Russian law. This unconventional status combined with Prigozhin’s close ties to President Putin has allowed Wagner to function as an unofficial extension of Russian influence, all the while giving Moscow a veil of deniability.
After successfully annexing the Donbas region, Russia increasingly turned its attention to Africa, where Wagner would play a critical role in various sub-Saharan countries. For Russia, the deployment of a private military group offered strategic advantages: Wagner’s operations allowed the Kremlin to extend its influence without mobilizing domestic forces, reducing the risk of backlash at home and limiting international scrutiny.
Wagner’s role as a proxy enabled the Russian state, particularly under Putin’s leadership, to capitalize on its perceived relative material power advantages. As such, both the intelligence and military capabilities provided by Wagner were effectively leveraged to extend Russia’s international reach.
A Key to Russia’s Foreign Policy
Though Wagner has played a key role in advancing Russian interests in the Middle East – notably by supporting the Assad regime in Syria, a Russian ally, against U.S.-backed forces – it is in sub-Saharan Africa where it has most succeeded in promoting Russia’s interests. From 2014 onwards, Wagner shifted its focus to the African continent, embedding itself in countries such as Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic, with the aim of advancing the Russian agenda.
In Mali, the group has been accused of conducting counterinsurgency operations on behalf of the national government. In exchange, Wagner reportedly had access to the country’s natural resources, which helped fund its activities. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Wagner is alleged to have used front companies to support influence campaigns.The Central African Republic, once Wagner’s stronghold, used Prigozhin’s Internet Research Agency to spread pro-Russian disinformation.
Such wide-ranging activities went on for a decade, building a strong Russian influence in several African countries. However, the effectiveness of the proxy has waned following the death of its leaders in 2023, which has forced adjustments in Russia’s foreign policy strategy.
Contemporary Reality
Since the deaths of the Wagner’s leaders, Russia has shifted from a transactional military-based approach to a strategic one, focused on maximizing financial investments. Moreover, the private group has been fragmented and partially absorbed into official Russian national organizations, essentially making it a state-controlled apparatus. Russia once had an arm’s length relationship with the Wagner group, allowing it to advance its foreign policy objectives cheaply through unofficial channels, all without openly claiming ownership. However, the lack of centralized leadership has required a more top-down approach, limiting its flexibility as a foreign policy tool.
This shift has had a tangible impact on Wagner’s operations abroad, notably in Ukraine and various African countries. Consequently, with the loss of Prigozhin’s public authority, which previously granted Putin “plausible deniability,” the Kremlin now faces challenges in using the organization as an indirect instrument of its foreign policy. As a result, Russia is relying more heavily on diplomatic channels to sustain the influence Wagner helped build.
Although Wagner’s personnel remains active in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic, its influence appears to be diminishing. For instance, Mali has been reluctant to continue granting access to its natural resources. . Similarly, Burkina Faso’s has been withholding permission for Russian troops to enter the country, until Wagner troops are replaced by neutral African corps.
A New Wagner
In essence, the deaths of Wagner’s leaders, who acted for but technically not under Russia’s influence, have reshaped the organization’s role and utility for Moscow. While Prigozhin acted as an insurance of “plausible deniability,” his death brought more responsibility to Russia for Wagner’s actions on the global stage. Hence, this new reality has pushed Russia to pivot from relying on Wagner’s shadow operations to prioritizing traditional diplomatic channels to expand its influence.
Edited by Flore Lemaire
The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and they do not reflect the position of the McGill Journal of Political Science or the Political Science Students’ Association.
Featured Image by Barbara Debout