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Technological advances in military technology such as drones, and new tactics like disinformation campaigns, have changed how states anticipate and respond to threats. These advances were built using the capabilities developed through trade globalisation following World War II, which inextricably linked adversarial states, –the U.S. and China –raising the high costs of direct confrontations, whether in the form of military action or comprehensive economic sanctions. This is an ideal outcome of global economic integration, as economic integration will encourage cooperation, making conflict a last resort. In an increasingly tense international environment, a new kind of confrontation has emerged: ‘hybrid warfare.’
Hybrid attacks like hacking campaigns, GPS jamming, and drone incursions push boundaries and test adversary resolve, leaving enough plausible deniability to avoid direct military confrontation. On September 9th, 2025, Russian Gerbara drones entered Polish airspace, which the Russian ambassador to the UN claimed was impossible due to distance limitations. Later that same month, Russian fighter jets crossed into Estonian airspace, where they remained for an unprecedented 12 minutes. On Telegram, Russia’s defence ministry claimed they were on a scheduled flight, and did not violate the borders of any state, as confirmed by “independent checks”. Poland, Estonia, and other NATO members scrambled jets in response, and both countries invoked NATO consultations under Article 4. Additionally, an array of similar incidents, mostly drone incursions, over the Baltic sea, have occurred. Yet, because Russia denies intent or responsibility, states have struggled to find an appropriate response. No state wants to take the first strike against a nuclear power, and prompt an acute conflict. Yet at the same time, a response is necessary: in the EU, 68% of citizens want the Union to play a greater role in protecting citizens against international crises and security risks.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that Poland would shoot down any flying object which entered its airspace, careful to add that in ambiguous situations, like fighter jet incursions over Polish waters, deliberation is necessary before response. Defining hybrid warfare is troublesome because its unconventional means are outside operational rules of engagement and international legal frameworks. Actors can deescalate or deny responsibility if challenged. After repeated drone sightings over Denmark’s airports and military facilities, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said a “hybrid war in Europe was underway…there is only one country willing to threaten us and it is Russia.” Officially, the Danish government has not pinpointed responsibility for the drone flights.
Ambiguity is possibly the greatest strategic value of hybrid warfare: if both parties want to avoid war, this ambiguity is an off ramp. The grey zone may actually prevent the kind of rigid escalation ladders which characterized Cold War Brinkmanship. Because it spans many domains (cyber, information, economic), no single legal or institutional definition fits.Hybrid warfare is powerful because it is hard to define. It operates in a grey area, giving states plausible deniability and flexibility. How governments and institutions define and communicate hybrid warfare shapes public understanding, response, and even policy decisions.
How hybrid warfare is framed shapes public understanding of it. As an attack, it prompts calls for retaliation and the bolstering of national defence, risking escalation. As an ‘incident’, or mistake, it deescalates but leaves a strategic vulnerability. Governments may downplay hybrid attacks to avoid conflict, or exaggerate them to shore up support and rally people around the nation. This framing confusion leaves the public uncertain about what’s happening, or unaware they’re even being targeted. This appears in cases of cyber attacks, like China’s Salt Typhoon operation.
The most far-reaching known cyber attack to date, Salt Typhoon was a multiyear and coordinated cyberattack where hackers infiltrated major telecommunications networks as well as lodging and transport companies. Cynthia Kaiser, a former senior FBI cyber official who led parts of the investigation, noted that the campaign’s reach was so extensive it likely affected nearly every American. In a statement, the Chinese Foreign Ministry denied involvement, instead saying Salt Typhoon came from “a transnational ransomware group.”
This ambiguity makes hybrid warfare not only a new and changing form of confrontation, but also a form of political communication. The challenge in defining hybrid warfare allows competing narratives to emerge from all sides. In this sense, hybrid warfare exists as much in the discursive arena as in the digital or diplomatic one. The blurred boundaries allow governments to spin hybrid events to fit domestic agendas. One administration may use a cyberattack to rally nationalist sentiment or justify increased surveillance. In the UK, the 2019 Investigatory Powers Act massively expanded the data surveillance powers of the state. One justification was that foreign governments could access data the UK government could not, as part of an operation similar to Salt Typhoon. The act gave the government authority over a purposefully vague category of data where individuals have a low or “no expectation of privacy.” According to the Guardian , CCTV images and facial images fall under this category. The surveillance network is extensive: according to the British police, the average Briton is recorded on CCTV 70 times per day.
There is no single solution to hybrid warfare’s ambiguity; it is part of its strategic design and political function. Technology complicates this further, bringing fast paced changes for legal and institutional adaptations and regulations. Resilience to hybrid attacks can improve through stronger transparency, and better public communication about what ‘could’ define a hybrid attack. Yet, some uncertainty will always remain.
The lack of definitional clarity for hybrid warfare does not just obscure accountability, it creates space for narrative construction, raising the possibility of threat perception becoming a matter of political goals rather than objective assessment. Russia’s recent incursions into Estonia and Poland, as well as China’s Salt Typhoon operation, expose the tightrope state and official actors walk when perpetrating or responding to hybrid warfare. This is escalation, without triggering direct conflict. Ultimately, the framing of hybrid warfare shapes state behaviour, and by extension, citizen beliefs. Determining whether people see themselves as targets, bystanders, or participants in a conflict unfolding largely beyond their awareness.
Edited by Jude Archer
The argument defended in this article is solely that of the author and does not reflect the position of the McGill Journal of Political Science, the Political Science Students’ Association, or the McGill Department of Political Science.
Featured image by State Emergency Service of Ukraine
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